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IT’S THE SECONDARY
TERM - DO YOU KNOW
WHERE YOUR LEASE IS?

Charles C. Steincamp

IT’S THE SECONDARY TERM DO YOU KNOW WHERE YOUR LEASE IS?

Oil

and gas leases have been structured since time immemorial into a primary or fixed

term followed by a secondary term that is dependent on the conduct o f the lessee for its duration.
The lessee must either produce oil or gas from the lease or fit within one o f the various “excuse”
clauses contained in the lease.
During the secondary term o f a standard oil and gas lease the lessee is operating under the
portion o f the lease known as the habendum clause. This paper will focus on the issues
surrounding operations in the secondary term.

Habendum Clause
The habendum clause contained in the common forms o f oil and gas leases are all drafted
as a special limitation on the grant.1 The lease lasts during the primary term and “as long

1
Haby v. Stanolind Oil and Gas Company, 228 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1955); Dethloff v.
Zeigler Coal Company, 412 N.E. 2d 526 (111. 1980), cert, denied 451 U.S. 910 (1981); Noel
Estates, Inc. v. Murray, 65 S. 2d 886 (La. 1953); Peckham v. Dunning, 125 NYS 2d 895 (NY
Sup. Ct. 1953); Hannah v. Shorts, 125 N.E. 2d 338 (Oh. 1955); Brown v. Haight, 255 A.2d 508
(Pa. 1969); Watson v. Rochmill, 155 S.W. 2d 783 (Tx. 1941); McCullough Oil Inc. v. Rezek, 346
S.E. 2d 788 (W.Va. 1986); Stewart v. Amerada Hess Corporation, 604 P. 2d 854 (Ok. 1979);
Reese Enterprises, Inc. v. Larson, 553 P.2d 885 (Kan. 1976); Reynolds v. McNeill, 236 S.W. 2d
723 (Ar. 1951); Turner v. Reynolds Metal Company, 721 S.W. 2d 626 (Ar. 1986).
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thereafter as oil and gas, or either of them, is produced . . . .2
This limitation means that the lessee is not required to do anything, however, if he fails to
satisfy the terms o f the lease it will terminate under its own terms. This automatic termination
puts the burden on the lessee to be diligent in his efforts to maintain his lease.

Paving Quantities
Even though not written into the lease, Courts in almost every producing state engraft
upon the requirement o f production in the habendum clause a further requirement that the
production be “paying quantities.”3 Courts have developed two approaches to determine whether
a well is in fact producing “paying quantities.” Under the arithmetic test the question becomes
when viewed objectively “will the lease produce a profit, however small, over operating
expenses after eliminating the initial costs o f drilling and equipping the well or wells on the lease
which are required to prepare the lease for production.”4 If the lease does not produce “paying
quantities” based on this objective test then the lease expires under its own terms. The second
test is known as the prudent operator test. In using that test, Courts first perform an objective

2 Producers 88 1- 43B Oil and Gas Lease Form.
3 Turner v. Reynolds Metal Company, 721 S.W. 2d 626 (Ark. 1986); Barnard v. Gibson,
224 P.2d 90 (Ca. 1950); A dolf v. Stearns, 64 P.2d 372 (Kan. 1984); Cumberland Contracting
Company v. Coffey, 405 S.W. 2d 553 (Kt 1966); Michigan Wisconsin Pipeline Company v.
Michigan National Bank, 3024 N.W. 2d 541 (1982); Henry v. Clay, 274 P.2d 545 (Ok. 1954);
Garcia v. King, 164 S.W. 2d 509 (Tx. 1942); LSA-R.S. 31:124(La. Civil Code requiring the
same).
4 Wrestler v. Colt, 644 P. 2d 1342 (Ks. App. 1982); Garcia v. King, 164 S.W. 2d 509 (T:
1942); Superior Oil Company v. Devon Corporation, 458 F. Supp. 1063 (D.Ne. 1978); Gypsy 0
Company v. Marsh, 248 P. 329 (Ok. 1926).
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analysis o f whether the lease is in fact producing in paying quantities over expenses, then, only in
the event it is not, the court turns to whether a prudent operator would continue to produce the
well in spite o f the fact that it is not producing in commercial quantities. The leading case
concerning the prudent operator test is the case o f Clifton v. Koontz.5 The Texas court in that
case stated “in determining paying quantities, in accordance with the above standard, the trial
court necessarily must take into consideration all matters which would influence a reasonable and
prudent operator. Some o f these factors are: the depletion o f the reservoir and the price for
which the lessee is able to sell his produce, the relative profitableness o f other wells in the area,
the operating and marketing costs o f the lease, his net profit, the lease provisions, a reasonable
period o f time under the circumstances, and whether or not the lessee is holding the lease merely
for speculative purposes.” This formulation has been adopted by a number o f courts.6

Accounting
However, even in jurisdictions that have strictly adopted the objective test there are still a
host o f issues concerning the application o f that test. The typical rule with regard to includible
expenses is that includible costs include all direct costs encountered whether paid or accrued in
operating the lease as a prudent operator. These direct costs include labor, trucking,
transportation expenses, replacement and repair of equipment, taxes, license and permit fees,
operator’s time on the lease, maintenance and repair o f roads, entrances and gates, and expenses

5 Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W. 2d 684 (Tx. 1959).
6 Webb v. Hardage Corporation, 471 So. 2d 889 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985); Michigan
Wisconsin Pipeline Company v. Michigan National Bank, 324 N.W. 2d 541 (Mi. 1982); Barby v.
Singer, 648 P.2d 14 (Ok. 1982).
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encountered in compliance with state laws which require the plugging o f abandoned wells in
prevention o f pollution.7 In addition to direct costs there are still questions concerning inclusions
of more indirect costs. One o f these items is the overhead costs o f the operator.8 Courts have
taken divergent views concerning inclusion o f overhead. Another item o f dispute is depreciation.
Some courts hold that depreciation should be included as an operating expense.9 However, the
general rule is that depreciation should not be considered as an expense in determining the
profitableness o f production to the extent that depreciation relates to the initial investment o f
drilling the w ell.10 However, there are some courts that have distinguished between depreciation
o f the original investment and depreciation o f the production equipment.11
A further difficulty in the paying quantities determination is the appropriate accounting
period to be used in making the paying quantities determination. Most courts have held that a
reasonable period o f time should be used to determine whether the well is producing in paying
quantities. The determination of a reasonable period o f time typically results in the application in

7 Reese Enterprises, Inc. v. Lawson , 553 P.2d 885 (Ka. 1976); Ross Explorations, Inc. v.
Freedom Energy, Inc., 8 S.W. 3d 511 (Ar. 2000); Garcia v. King, 164 S.W. 2d 509 (Tx. 1942).
8 Compare and contrast Shelly Oil Company v. Archer, 356 S.W. 2d 774 (Tx. 1961),
(Items o f overhead charges which can be traceable to the actual expense o f production should be
considered.); United Central Oil Corporation v. Helm, 11 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1926), (Overhead
charges should be considered.); Mason v. Ladd Petroleum Corporation, 630 P.2d 1283 (Ok.
1981), (Administrative overhead and district expenses should not be considered.)
9 Transport Oil Company v. Exeter Oil Company, 191 P.2d 129 (Ca. 1948).
10 Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W. 2d 684 (Tx. 1959). Ross Explorations, Inc. v. Freedom
Energy, Inc., 8 S.W. 3d 511 (Ar. 2000); Texaco, Inc. v. Fox, 618 P.2d 844 (Ka. 1980).
11 Whitaker v. Texaco, Inc., 283 F.2d 169 (10th Cir. 1960); Stewart v. Amerada Hess
Corporation, 604 P. 2d 854 (Ok. 1979).
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practice if not by admission o f the court o f the prudent operator test.12

Other Excuses
Operations Clause
Some habendum clauses refer to various operations on the premises as an alternative
means o f extending the life of the lease. Typically such clauses are appended to the end o f the
habendum clause. A common lease form provides

.. or the premises are being developed or

operated.” 13 Courts have generally given these clauses effect by applying a prudent operator type
standard. Where operations are conducted diligently and in good faith Courts have typically
upheld the lease.14

Dry Hole Clause
The issues involved in the dry hole clause are first the determination as to whether the dry
hole clause operates into the secondary term or whether it is limited by its terms to the primary

12 Texaco, Inc. v. Fox , 618 P.2d 844 (Ka. 1980), (“The better rule precludes the use o f a
rigid fixed term for determination of profitability and uses a reasonable time depending upon the
circumstances o f each case, taking into consideration sufficient time to reflect the current
production status o f the lease and thus to provide the information which a prudent operator
would take into account in whether to continue or to abandon the operation.”); Clifton v. Koontz,
305 S.W. 2d 782 (Tx. Civ. App. 1957); Transport Oil Company v. Exeter Oil Company, 191
P.2d 129 (Ca. 1948).
13 Producers 88 1-43B Oil and Gas Lease Form.
14 Pardue v. Mark , 279 S.W. 2d 594 (Tx. Cir. App. 1955); Prowant v. Sealy, 187 P. 235
(Okl. 1920); Adolph v. Stearns, 684 P.2d 372 (Kan. 1984).
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term.1516 Some clauses by their terms have been held to extend even into the secondary term. For
example in the case of Stanoland Oil and Gas Company v. Newman Brothers Drilling

Company.16 The lease contained the following dry hole provision: “If prior to discovery o f oil or
gas on said land lessee should drill a dry hole or holes thereon . . . this lease shall not terminate if
lessee commences additional drilling or reworking operations within 60 days thereafter, or (if it
be within the primary term) commences or resumes the payment or tender o f rentals. . .”. The
Texas court held that the lease was preserved by new drilling operations commenced within 60
days after the completion of a dry hole, even though the dry hole itself was completed after the
expiration of the primary term. This rule has been followed by several jurisdictions.17

Cessation of Production Clause
Typical cessation of production clauses provide for the commencement o f new operations
within a certain time or for the resumption of rental payments by the lessee if the cessation
occurs during the primary term. The courts have used the test of whether the cessation is

15 . See Long v. Magnolia Petroleum Company, 89 N.W. 2d 245 (Ne. 1958).
16 Stanoland Oil and Gas Company v. Newman Brothers Drilling Company. 305 S.W. 2d
169 (Tx. 1957).
17 Harper v. Hudson Gas and Oil Corporation, 189 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. of La. 1960) Aff.
299 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1962). (Dry hole was completed after the expiration of the primary term
and within 60 days thereafter a portion of the lease hole was included in a compulsory unit with
premises on which there was located a producing well.). Owens v. Superior Oil Company, 730
P.2d 458 (N.M. 1986), (Lease was preserved by pooling the leasehold with other premises and by
engaging in further drilling off the lease but on the pool deck which resulted in production.);
Somer v. Harris Trust and Savings Bank, 566 P.2d 775 (Ka. 1977).
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permanent and not merely temporary.18 The kinds o f evidence relevant to the question o f
whether the cessation is temporary or permanent typically are (1) the period o f times that the
cessation has persisted; (2) the intent o f the operator; and (3) the cause o f the cessation.19 These
issues tend to devolve into an application o f the prudent operator standard.

Shut In Royalty
The operation o f gas wells involves unique considerations due to the nature o f the product
that are not inherent in the production o f oil. First and foremost, because gas is not amenable to
transportation other than by pipeline, issues then arise as to the lessee’s ability to maintain an oil
and gas lease in the event no pipeline is available with which to market his gas. Some states hold
that discovery o f paying quantities o f gas is equivalent to “production in paying quantities.”
These states are West Virginia, Montana, Wyoming and Oklahoma. In these states, a shut in
royalty clause is not necessary in an oil and gas lease so long as the lessee acts as a prudent
operator finding market for the production. However, a number o f states require marketing of
gas at the end o f the primary term in order to preserve the lease. These states are Texas,
Louisiana, New Mexico, and Kansas. Some states such as North Dakota and Arkansas have not
clearly ruled on the issue o f whether actual marketing o f gas is required to extend the lease
beyond the primary term.
In the states not requiring marketing in order to extend the lease beyond the primary term,

18 KelwoodFarms, Inc. v. Ritchie, 571 P.2d 338 (Ka. 1977).
19 Wrestler v. Colt, 644 P. 2d 1342 (Ks. App. 1982); Reynolds v. McNeill, 236 S.W. 2d
723 (Ar. 1951); Watson v. Rochmill, 155 S.W. 2d 783 (Tx. 1941); Amoco Production Company
v. Braslau, 561 S.W. 2d 805 (Tx. 1978); Cotner v. Warren, 330 P.2d 217 (Ok. 1958).
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the lease will not terminate as long as the lessee diligently searches for a market. However, in
those states where marketing is required, failure to pay shut in royalty in a timely manner or to
market gas will cause the lease to terminate.20 In addition, failure to pay shut in royalty in the
proper manner will result in lease termination.21 In addition, courts have interpreted shut in
royalty provisions to be applicable only when there is no market for the gas from a given well. In
the case o f Tucker v. Hugoton Energy Corporation, 855 P.2d 929 (Kan. 1993) a broad form of
shut in royalty clause did not permit the lessee to shut in production in an effort to negotiate a
better gas contract with his purchaser and the lease was terminated.

Conclusion
We are all bound by the whims o f some long ago lessee that structured oil and gas leases.
Little has changed since the 1800's in the overall form o f the oil and gas lease. As a result o f
decisions made long ago oil and gas operators must be extremely diligent to either market oil and
gas in paying quantities or assure themselves that they are within one o f the “excuses” in the
lease. Unfortunately, a new cottage industry has sprung up with the revival o f prices seeking to
cancel oil and gas leases that are in the secondary term.22 So the question is: “It’s the secondary
term: Do you know where your lease is?”

20 Osborne v. Rogers, 261 S.W.2d 311 (Tx. 1953); Pray v. Premier Petroleum, 662 P.2d
255 (Kan. 1983).
21 Amber Oil and Gas Company v. Bratton, 711 S.W. 2d 741 (Tx. App. 1986), (Lessee
accidently paid shut in royalty to the wrong party and the lease terminated.)
22 National Gas Pipeline Company v. Pool, 30 S.W. 3d 618 (Tx. App. 2000), (1937 lease
held by production, two new wells drilled in 1996, suit filed 1998, aserting lease terminated due
to interruptions in production for brief periods in 1959, 1960, 1961, 1963, 1964, and 1969.)
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